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Abstract 
Neighborhood racial and class segregation continue to be major social problems within America’s 
metropolitan areas. Segregation has been linked to a whole host of racial and class inequalities, including 
access to jobs, schooling and single parenthood, and future earnings. One factor accounting for segregation 
is the inability of black and lower income households to afford housing in white neighborhoods, where 
housing units historically have been largely owner-occupied single-family homes. In recent years there has 
been a shift in the housing makeup of many of these neighborhoods, with rentals and foreclosures increasing 
in share. This has made housing more affordable in these neighborhoods. In this paper we investigate the 
impact that foreclosures and three types of rentals (single-family, condominium, and apartments) have on 
neighborhood racial and income integration using data from Miami-Dade County, Florida. We find that 
neighborhoods have become more racially and socially integrated as rentals have increased as a share of 
the housing stock. 
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1. Introduction 
Neighborhood racial and class segregation continue to be major social problems within America’s 
metropolitan areas. Segregation has been linked to a whole host of inequalities, including access to jobs 
(Weinberg, 2000), schooling and single parenthood (Cutler and Glaeser, 1997), and future earnings (Chetty 
et al., 2014). One factor accounting for segregation is that housing in white neighborhoods tends to be 
relatively expensive, owner-occupied, single-family homes that many lower income and black households 
find unaffordable. Either these households cannot afford the price of these homes or they are unable to 
satisfy mortgage underwriting criteria. However, housing affordability is improving in many of these 
neighborhoods.  
As is well known, foreclosures grew in the years following the Great Recession. Foreclosures tend to 
sell at a discount and their negative spillover effects tend to depress the values of neighborhood properties. 
Less well known is that there has been a remarkable shift in the housing tenure of many urban 
neighborhoods in favor of rentals, especially single-family rentals.1 The latter is an important legacy of the 
housing market crash that accompanied the Great Recession that initiated the conversion of millions of 
single-family homes within America’s neighborhoods that were once owner-occupied into rentals, as 
billions of dollars of private equity have poured into the single-family home rental business.2 By making 
housing more affordable, the growth in foreclosures and rentals have expanded the housing opportunities 
of minority and lower income households, especially in higher quality neighborhoods. 
The question we address in this paper is whether this increase in affordability has resulted in more 
racially and socially mixed neighborhoods. Extant evidence on this issue is thin and mixed; hence, there is 
                                                     
1 Based upon property tax records from Florida, Ihlanfeldt et al. (2018) show that on average across Florida’s urban counties the 
share of housing units represented by rentals increased six percentage points from 42 percent in 2000 to 48 percent in 2014, while 
the growth in the single-family rental share increased seven percentage points from 15 to 22 percent. Based on their own 
calculations using data from the American Community Survey (ACS), the rentals share at the national level measured over a shorter 
period (2005—2014) grew from 33.1 to 36.9 percent, while the share of single-family rentals grew from 10.2 to 12.9 percent. They 
note that the ACS does not report the rental shares broken down by urban versus rural, but based on their findings from Florida the 
increase in the shares of rentals for urban areas nationally is expected to be much greater than for urban and rural areas combined. 
2 The lion’s share of the investment in single-family rentals has originated from institutional investors (Smith and Liu, 2017; Mills 
et al., 2016). Mills et al. (2016) conclude that these investors are in for the long haul and do not intend to liquidate their rental 
holdings anytime soon. This suggests that single-family rentals in neighborhoods are here to stay. 
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a clear need for further investigation. Our analysis is based on a panel of all of the neighborhoods in Miami-
Dade County, Florida covering the years 2006 through 2016. For the years 2006 through 2012 we relate 
shifts in a neighborhood’s housing stock in the current year in favor of single-family REOs and three 
different types of rentals (single-family homes, apartments, and condominiums) to changes in the U.S. 
Census Bureau’s estimated average racial and income composition within the neighborhood measured over 
the current and future four years.3 Hence, the estimation allows changes in the neighborhood’s shares of 
these housing types to have a long run effect on the percentage the neighborhood’s residents who are black 
and the percentage of the households in the neighborhood who are poor.4 Having found that rentals increase 
the black percentage, we then estimate the net number of non-Hispanic blacks, non-Hispanic whites, and 
Hispanics who move into or out of the neighborhood in response to changes in the housing types. This 
allows us to investigate whether a rental induced increase in the percentage of blacks living in the 
neighborhood is driven by black entry or the exit of the other two racial groups. If the rentals are increasing 
the black share of the neighborhood by inducing non-black flight, this would distract from the attractiveness 
of polices to place more rental housing in better neighborhoods. Similarly, we explore the extent to which 
the migrations of poor and non-poor households in response to changes in the different housing types 
account for their effect on the percentage of poor households living in the neighborhood. An advantage of 
our approach is that we estimate control function models that enable us to test for the endogeneity of each 
of the housing types and instrument them where necessary using a convincing identification strategy.  
Separate models are estimated using all of the county’s neighborhoods, neighborhoods where blacks or 
poor households are underrepresented, and neighborhoods found within white suburban jurisdictions. Poor 
households are divided into poor (household income less than the county median) and very poor (household 
income less than one half of the county median). The results show that an increase in the share of the 
                                                     
3 REO is the acronym for Real Estate Owned properties, which are homes that are owned by financial institutions as a result of 
foreclosure proceedings.  
4 An alternative approach to capturing the long run effect of an increase in a housing type on neighborhood segregation would be 
to regress an annual measure of neighborhood racial composition on the share of the type of housing in the current year and in 
lagged years to obtain the long run propensity. The ACS, however, does not report neighborhood race annually at the block group 
level (our neighborhood unit). Only a five-year average is reported by the ACS. 
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neighborhood’s housing units that are apartments increases the black, poor, and very poor percentages 
across all three samples. Condominium rentals have similar effects, while single-family rentals affect only 
the income and not the racial mix of neighborhoods, suggesting that racial discrimination may play a more 
important role in the single-family rental market in comparison to the other rental markets. An increase in 
the share of REOs generally fails to affect either the racial or the income mix of the neighborhood. Our 
estimated migration models show that within neighborhoods where blacks are underrepresented the positive 
effects that apartments and condominium rentals have on the black percentage of the neighborhood come 
largely from black entry rather than non-black exit. In contrast, in neighborhoods where poor and very poor 
households are underrepresented, the apartments and condominium rentals induced rise in the poor and 
very poor percentages are found to come from both poor entry and non-poor exit, while the positive effect 
that single-family rentals have on the poor percentages in these neighborhoods is entirely the result of non-
poor exit.  
2. Literature Review 
On the surface the idea that improving housing affordability in better neighborhoods should result in a 
residential reshuffling of a community’s disadvantaged households in favor of these areas may seem self-
evident. However, there are reasons to suggest that such resorting may not occur. First, blacks and lower 
income households may encounter housing market discrimination that limits their ability to take advantage 
of cheaper housing in neighborhoods where high percentages of whites and higher income households 
reside. Second, the locational decisions of disadvantaged households may be governed by other stronger 
needs that keep them living within segregated neighborhoods. These include access to jobs, welfare 
services, or public transportation. Finally, it has been suggested that the distance of the move, which may 
be quite lengthy involving a move from one side of the urban area to the other, may be too arduous for 
some families to overcome (Ellen et al., 2016). Long distances may also limit the knowledge that 
disadvantaged household have of the affordable housing opportunities found within better neighborhoods. 
 5 
 
Hence, the correct answer to the question of whether housing segregation declines in response to more 
affordable housing within white or higher income neighborhoods is unclear, a priori.  
To our knowledge, no study has investigated the effect that rentals have on neighborhood housing 
integration. There are, however, a number of studies whose results relate to the issue of whether minority 
and low income families move to better neighborhoods in response to an increase in housing affordability. 
One set of papers investigates whether lower income and minority families residentially relocate so that 
their children can attend a better school if housing within that school’s attendance zone becomes more 
affordable (Ihlanfeldt and Mayock, 2018a,b; Ihlanfeldt, 2019). Using data on Florida school districts these 
papers are differentiated by their focus on different disadvantaged groups, the use of alternative measures 
of affordable housing and their adoption of different identification strategies. Remarkably, they share a 
common conclusion; namely, that placing a larger share of a district’s affordable housing within better 
school zones reduces racial and income school segregation. A limitation of this research is that only short 
run outcomes are analyzed. If the entrance of minority or lower income families into the neighborhood or 
their children into the neighborhood school induces whites to flee, the long and short run outcomes may be 
very different and it is the long run effect that garners the greater interest. 
Evidence inconsistent with that from the above studies comes from the Moving To Opportunity (MTO) 
experiment (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2011) and national data on the residential locations of housing voucher 
recipients (Horn et al., 2014). The MTO experiment offered housing vouchers to two groups of eligible 
households. One group had no constraint on where they could locate, while the other group was required 
to locate in a low poverty neighborhood. Interestingly, the uptake rates (i.e., the percentage of households 
accepting the vouchers) were low. The percentages were 63% and 48% for the locational unconstrained 
and constrained groups, respectively. These results suggest that many disadvantaged households may not 
move to better neighborhoods when the opportunity presents itself. Similar findings are provided by Horn 
et al. (2014). Using confidential data on the residential locations of voucher recipients from the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the authors find that the children of voucher holders were 
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more likely to attend low-performing schools than the children of households that did not receive housing 
vouchers.  
In summary, the results of some studies suggest that improved housing affordability can reduce 
neighborhood segregation, while the results of other studies suggest that disadvantaged households do not 
move or locate in favor of better neighborhoods in response to offered or accepted housing vouchers. As 
noted earlier, a limitation of the first group of studies is that they focus exclusively on short run effects. In 
addition, only the movement of families with children are considered. Studies in the second group are 
limited in that only the location decisions of subsidized households are considered. Our analysis is not 
subject to either of these limitations. We investigate the long run changes in neighborhood racial and income 
composition that result from an improvement in housing affordability, as captured by a neighborhood’s 
shift in housing tenure in favor of different types of rentals, where all blacks and lower income households 
are included in the analysis. 
3. Conceptual Framework5 
Extant evidence indicates that a shift of a neighborhood’s housing stock in favor of REOs or rentals has 
two effects. On the one hand, they lower neighborhood quality in two ways: 1) they produce negative sight 
externalities due to their lower upkeep and 2) they raise the level of neighborhood crime.6 On the other 
hand, the deferred maintenance of REOs decreases their price and this combined with their positive impact 
on crime creates negative spillover effects that increases the affordability of housing.7 Rentals may improve 
affordability by producing similar negative spillover effects; however, the principal affordability advantage 
                                                     
5 Our conceptual framework, presented descriptively in this section, is based on a static general equilibrium model of the impact 
of foreclosures on neighborhood residential sorting that we developed in previous work (Ihlanfeldt and Mayock, 2018b). We refer 
readers to this paper for a more formal theoretical model underlying our empirical work.  
6 Evidence on the poor physical condition of foreclosures is provided by (Gerardi et al., 2015) and the National Fair Housing 
Alliance (2012). Many studies have found that rentals are less well maintained than owner-occupied housing (Galster, 1983; 
Gatzlaff et al., 1998; Harding et al., 2000; Shilling et al., 1991). Ellen et al. (2013) find that neighborhood crime is positively 
associated with foreclosures, while Ihlanfeldt et al. (2018) demonstrate a relationship between neighborhood crime and rentals. 
7 A plethora of studies have found that foreclosures lower the rents and values of nearby properties. For a review of these studies 
see Ihlanfeldt and Mayock (2016b). 
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of rentals comes from their lower cost of neighborhood entry in comparison to owner-occupied units.8 In 
sorting across neighborhoods households weigh the affordability advantage provided by REOs and rentals 
against their negative impact on neighborhood quality. The relative importance of these two factors may 
vary with the race and income level of the household. There are many possible scenarios. Our interest is 
whether blacks and lower income households give more weight to the affordability advantage and thereby 
sort into neighborhoods with larger shares of REOs or rentals. If so, this has the potential of increasing the 
percentage of the neighborhood’s households who are black or low income. However, these percentages 
may also rise if whites or high income households place more weight on neighborhood quality than 
affordability in making their location decisions, causing a net outmigration from neighborhoods with larger 
shares of REOs or rentals. This underscores the importance of empirically addressing not only the change 
in the racial or income composition of neighborhoods in response to an increase in their REO or rental 
shares but also the magnitudes of the in-migration and out-migration of racial and income groups in possibly 
accounting for these results. 
4. Data 
Our study area is Miami-Dade County, Florida. The County has a large population (2.5 million, 
according to 2010 Census), which includes large percentages of all three racial groups---non-Hispanic 
blacks, non-Hispanic whites, and Hispanics and high levels of both racial and income neighborhood 
housing segregation.9 In addition, over the course of our panel the housing stocks in a majority of the 
neighborhoods within the County experienced a shift in favor of REOs and rentals, where a neighborhood 
is defined as a census block group. 10  Hence, it is an ideal area for study given the purpose of our 
                                                     
8 The entry cost on rental housing is the security deposit and required renters’ insurance, while the upfront cost of obtaining owner-
occupied housing is the down payment on the mortgage and associated fees.  
9 The St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank reports the white to non-white racial dissimilarity index for Miami-Dade County equaled 
48.83 in 2016: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/RACEDISPARITY012086. The Racial Dissimilarity Index measures the 
percentage of the non-Hispanic white population in a county which would have to change Census tracts to equalize the racial 
distribution between white and non-white population groups across all tracts in the county. The Pew Research Center lists the 
Miami Metro Area as having the tenth worst neighborhood income segregation among the Nation’s largest 30 areas: 
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/08/01/the-rise-of-residential-segregation-by-income/. 
10 The block group is a geographical subunit of a census tract. Typically, block groups have a population of 600 to 3,000 people. 
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investigation. Two main sources of data were used to construct our panel of neighborhoods. To construct 
our housing variables, we used property tax records from the Florida Department of Revenue for the years 
2006—2012. These records provide a complete count of all housing types within each neighborhood. The 
types include single-family, condominium and apartment homes and REOs.  
Importantly for our study, the tax roll data also contains fields that indicate whether or not a property 
was granted a property tax homestead exemption. This exemption is available to a person who makes the 
property his or her permanent residence. We use the presence of a homestead exemption to classify a 
property as owner-occupied, and housing units without a homestead exemption are classified as renter-
occupied. Because the exemption provides significant tax savings, owner-occupants have strong financial 
incentives to file for the exemption, and we are thus confident that owner-occupied units will generally be 
correctly classified based on homestead status.11 Properties that are not covered by a homestead exemption 
are primarily either rental units or second homes. The fraction of non-homesteaded single-family homes 
that are second homes is expected to be small because in Florida most vacation homes are condominiums. 
For condominiums we cannot rule out the possibility that some of the properties we label as rentals may in 
fact be second homes not available for rent.  
Our second main source of data comes from the American Community Survey (ACS). For each 
neighborhood (block group) the ACS reports a five-year average of the number of each racial group residing 
in the neighborhood. Also provided is the average number of households falling within 17 different income 
groups. From these data we calculated the average percentages of the neighborhood’s population who are 
black, who are poor (income less than the county median), and who are very poor (income one-half of the 
county median). We match each year for which we measure the composition of the housing stock with the 
ACS averages. For example, for 2006, the first year of our panel, each of the housing types within the 
neighborhood are counted on January 1, 2006. The associated five-year averages from the ACS covers the 
                                                     
Of the county’s 1,534 block groups, 55% and 65% experienced an increase in REOs and rentals as a share of the housing stock, 
respectively. The housing stock is defined as including REOs, single-family rental and owner-occupied homes, condominium rental 
and owner-occupied homes, and apartments. Rentals are identified based on the homestead exemption as described below. 
Corresponding percentages for single-family rentals and condominium rentals equal 58% and 42%, respectively.  
11 A homestead exemption decreases a property’s taxable value by as much as $50,000. 
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years 2006—2010. At the end of our panel, the housing counts are for January 1, 2012 and the ACS averages 
are for the years 2012—2016. 
Another source of data is DataQuick, which we used to get annual counts of the number of REOs in the 
neighborhood.12 We also drew from the property tax records to include in our panel the number of different 
types of non-residential land uses for each neighborhood/year observation. These included stores, service 
stations, restaurants, clubs and bars, office buildings, and churches. We used these variables as control 
variables in testing the robustness of our housing shares findings to the inclusion of properties other than 
housing units that may impact the attractiveness of the neighborhood to different racial and income groups.  
5. Empirical Methodology  
We are interested in empirically addressing two issues with our panel of Miami-Dade County 
neighborhoods. First, how do increases in REOs and different types of rentals as a share of the 
neighborhood’s total housing units affect the racial and income composition of the neighborhood. 
Subsection 5.1 describes the neighborhood composition models we estimated to shed light on this issue. 
Second, to what extent are changes in the composition of neighborhoods due to black/low income entry 
versus white/high income exit in response to changes in the housing shares. The migration models we 
estimated to address this question are described in Subsection 5.2.  
5.1 Neighborhood Racial and Income Composition Models 
To address the first issue, we first constructed a variety of neighborhood samples. These included all 
neighborhoods ( 𝑛 = 1,534), neighborhoods where black people were underrepresented ( 𝑛 = 1,120), 
neighborhoods where poor households were underrepresented (𝑛 = 788), neighborhoods where very poor 
households were underrepresented (𝑛 = 883) and neighborhoods within suburban white jurisdictions 
(𝑛 =408). A group is considered underrepresented within a neighborhood if at the beginning of our panel 
                                                     
12 The algorithm we used to identify REOs with these data is described in detail in our earlier paper (Ihlanfeldt and Mayock, 2016a). 
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the neighborhood percentage of the group is less than the county-wide percentage.13 The neighborhoods 
within the collection of white suburban jurisdictions are known to have the highest quality neighborhoods 
and schools within the county.14 Blacks are especially underrepresented in these places, with the average 
black neighborhood share at the beginning of our panel equaling only 1.68%. The corresponding poor 
(49.7%) and very poor (26.2%) household percentages, while lower than the county-wide percentages, are 
much closer to the county-wide averages. The suburban jurisdictions sample was employed to determine if 
a shift in favor of REOs or rentals enable blacks and the poor (very poor) to move into the highest quality 
neighborhoods.  
With our samples in hand, we then regressed in turn the percentages of blacks, the poor, and the very 
poor, measured over the years 𝑡 = 1 to 𝑡 = 5 on the 𝑡 = 1 shares of the neighborhood’s housing stock 
represented by single-family rentals, condominium owner-occupied and rental units, apartment rentals, and 
REOs.15 The excluded housing share from the equation is single-family owner-occupied units. Separate 
models were estimated for all neighborhoods, neighborhoods where the group was underrepresented and 
neighborhoods within the suburban jurisdictions. Formally, our neighborhood composition models can be 
expressed as: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑔𝑡 = 𝒔𝑖𝑔𝑡
′ 𝜷 + 𝒙𝑖𝑔𝑡
′ 𝜹 + 𝛼𝑔 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑔𝑡 ,  (1) 
where 𝑖 denotes the 𝑖𝑡ℎ neighborhood (block group), 𝑔 denotes the 𝑔𝑡ℎ census tract, and 𝑡 is time period 
index, for 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛; 𝑔 = 1, 2, … , 𝐺; and 𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇. The dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑔𝑡  is the five-year 
average covering years 𝑡 through 𝑡 + 4 of the percentage of non-Hispanic blacks or the percentage of the 
poor (very poor) residing in neighborhood 𝑖 within tract 𝑔, for the racial and income composition models, 
respectively. 𝒔𝑖𝑔𝑡 = (𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑡,1, 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑡,2, … , 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑡,𝐽)
′  is the 𝐽 × 1  vector of possibly endogenous housing shares 
                                                     
13 The county-wide percentage of black people equaled 17.7%. The county-wide percentages of poor and very poor households 
equaled 55.5% and 29.6%, respectively.  
14 The jurisdictions are Aventura, Bal Harbour, Bay Harbor Islands, Biscayne Park, Coral Gables, Doral, Golden Beach, Hialeah, 
Hialeah Gardens, Indian Creek, Medley, Miami Beach, Miami Lakes, Miami Springs, North Bay Village, Palmetto Bay, Pinecrest, 
Sunny Isles Beach, Surfside, Sweetwater, The Village of Key Biscayne, Virginia Gardens, and West Miami.  
15 Means and standard deviations of the housing shares are reported in Table A.1 of Appendix A. 
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measured for neighborhood 𝑖 of tract 𝑔 on January 1 of year 𝑡, with the associated vector of constant 
coefficients 𝜷. 𝒙𝑖𝑔𝑡 is a 𝐾 × 1 vector of strictly exogenous control variables (conditional on 𝛼𝑔) with the 
associated parameters 𝜹.16 𝛼𝑔 represents the unobserved time-invariant tract-specific heterogeneity, which 
can be correlated with all explanatory variables. 𝜃𝑡 signifies the year fixed effects. 𝜀𝑖𝑔𝑡 is the idiosyncratic 
time-varying error component.  
To obtain unbiased and consistent estimated effects of the housing shares on the racial and income 
composition of the neighborhood, the condition of strict exogeneity must be satisfied (Wooldridge, 2010, 
p.322). Strict exogeneity can be violated by reverse causation or by unobservables that effect neighborhood 
composition and are correlated with the housing shares. Because we are estimating how the housing shares 
drive the future racial composition of the neighborhood, it is unlikely that our estimated effects are biased 
by reverse causation. Unobservables that may affect both the dependent and independent variables that are 
unchanging over time are captured by our inclusion of tract fixed effects. There remains the possibility that 
strict exogeneity is violated by time-varying unobservables. In this case, the affected housing shares require 
instrumentation. Econometrically, the challenge is in determining which shares to instrument.  
We estimate model (1) using the control function (CF) approach. The CF approach is an alternative 
estimation strategy to the standard instrumental variable (IV) methods, including two stage least squares 
(2SLS) and generalized method of moments (GMM), which deal with the endogeneity problem. In linear 
(in parameter) models where the endogenous variables also show up linearly, the CF approach yields 
identical point estimates to the 2SLS estimates. However, the CF approach offers appealing advantages for 
models nonlinear in endogenous variables and/or nonlinear in parameters. As we will see, the Poisson 
model that we used in the study of migration in the next subsection is an example of the latter case and the 
endogeneity of the housing share variables cannot be readily handled by the standard IV methods.  
                                                     
16 The control variables are building types that may affect a neighborhood’s housing costs or its amenity value, apart from the 
effects of the housing shares. There are seven variables, which are the number of stores, service stations, restaurants, clubs/bars, 
office buildings, industrial properties, and churches. While we include the control variables in (1), they are not included in the 
models estimated that yielded the results reported in our tables. Our results are robust to their inclusion and they are generally 
statistically insignificant either together or alone. Details are provided below. 
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Even in the case of linear models as in (1) where the CF and 2SLS estimates coincide, the CF method 
provides an attractive estimation strategy. By including as regressors the residuals from the reduced form 
models for the endogenous variables, it not only corrects for endogeneity but also produces a simple 
variable addition test that is easily made robust to unknown heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.17 
Hence, for both our neighborhood composition and migration models the CF method addresses the issue of 
which shares should be treated as endogenous. Therefore, we estimated both composition and migration 
models by the CF approach. The CF approach requires the availability of valid instruments. Before 
describing our choice of instruments, we first explain the CF estimation of model (1). 
Assume that 𝒛𝑖𝑔𝑡 is an 𝐿 × 1 vector of strictly exogenous variables (conditional on 𝛼𝑔), where 𝒛𝑖𝑔𝑡 =
(𝒙𝑖𝑔𝑡
′ , 𝒛𝑖𝑔𝑡2
′ )′  with 𝒛𝑖𝑔𝑡2  being exogenous variables excluded from equation (1). Suppose that a linear 
reduced form of 𝒔𝑖𝑔𝑡 is given by 
 𝒔𝑖𝑔𝑡 = 𝚷𝒛𝑖𝑔𝑡 + 𝒂𝑔 + 𝝀𝑡 + 𝒆𝑖𝑔𝑡 ,  (2) 
where 𝚷  is a 𝐽 × 𝐿  matrix of parameters, 𝒂𝑔  and 𝝀𝑡  are 𝐽 × 1  vectors of tract and time fixed effects, 
respectively, 𝒆𝑖𝑔𝑡  is a 𝐽 × 1  vector of idiosyncratic errors.
18  Then we model the time-invariant 
heterogeneity by the Mundlak (1978) device: 
 𝛼𝑔 =  𝜓1 + ?̅?𝑔
′ 𝛏1 + 𝑟𝑔1, 
𝒂𝑔 =  𝝍2 + Ξ2?̅?𝑔 + 𝒓𝑔2, 
(3) 
(4) 
for 𝑔 = 1, 2, … , 𝐺, where ?̅?𝑔 = (1/𝑇𝑛𝑔) ∑ ∑ 𝒛𝑖𝑔𝑡
𝑛𝑔
𝑖=1
𝑇
𝑡=1 , 𝑛𝑔 is the number of block groups within the 𝑔
𝑡ℎ 
tract, 𝜓1,  𝝍2, 𝛏1, Ξ2 are constant parameters of conformable dimensions, and 𝑟𝑔1 and 𝒓𝑔2 are the error 
terms. Note that we assume the time-invariant heterogeneity exists primarily at the tract rather than the 
block group level since census tracts “are designed to be relatively homogenous with respect to population 
characteristics, economic status, and living conditions” (U.S. Census Bureau definition19). In addition, using 
                                                     
17 It is more difficult to make the traditional Hausman test that compares 2SLS and OLS robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and 
serial correlation. 
18 We are assuming the usual rank condition for identification holds. 
19 Available at https://factfinder.census.gov/help/en/census_tract.htm. 
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averages at the tract level helps alleviate multicollinearity between the housing shares and their time 
means.20 Substituting (3) into (1) yields 
𝑦𝑖𝑔𝑡 = 𝜓1 + 𝒔𝑖𝑔𝑡
′ 𝜷 + 𝒙𝑖𝑔𝑡
′ 𝜹 + ?̅?𝑔
′ 𝛏1 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑔𝑡 ,  (5) 
where 𝑢𝑖𝑔𝑡 = 𝑟𝑔1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑔𝑡. Assume that 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝒛𝑖𝑔𝑡, 𝑟𝑔1) = 𝟎 for all 𝑡, and note that 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝒛𝑖𝑔𝑡 , 𝜀𝑖𝑔𝑡′) = 𝟎 for 
all 𝑡 and 𝑡′ by the strict exogeneity of 𝒛𝑖𝑔𝑡, we have 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝒛𝑖𝑔𝑡, 𝑢𝑖𝑔𝑡′) = 𝟎 all 𝑡 and 𝑡
′. Then inserting (4) 
into (2) yields 
𝒔𝑖𝑔𝑡 =  𝝍2 + 𝚷𝒛𝑖𝑔𝑡 + Ξ2?̅?𝑔 + 𝝀𝑡 + 𝒗𝑖𝑔𝑡 ,  (6) 
where 𝒗𝑖𝑔𝑡 = (𝑣𝑖𝑔𝑡,1, 𝑣𝑖𝑔𝑡,2, … , 𝑣𝑖𝑔𝑡,𝐽)
′ = 𝒓𝑔2 + 𝒆𝑖𝑔𝑡 . Assuming that 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝒛𝑖𝑔𝑡, 𝒓𝑔2) = 𝟎  for all 𝑡  and 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝒛𝑖𝑔𝑡 , 𝒆𝑖𝑔𝑡′) = 𝟎  for all 𝑡  and 𝑡
′ , it is immediate that 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝒛𝑖𝑔𝑡 , 𝒗𝑖𝑔𝑡′) = 𝟎 for all 𝑡  and 𝑡
′ . Now 
projecting 𝑢𝑖𝑔𝑡 onto 𝒗𝑖𝑔𝑡 gives 
𝑢𝑖𝑔𝑡 = 𝒗𝑖𝑔𝑡
′ 𝝋 + 𝜁𝑖𝑔𝑡 ,  (7) 
where 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜁𝑖𝑔𝑡 , 𝒗𝑖𝑔𝑡) = 𝟎 by construction. Since both 𝑢𝑖𝑔𝑡′ and 𝒗𝑖𝑔𝑡′  are uncorrelated with 𝒛𝑖𝑔𝑡, 𝜁𝑖𝑔𝑡′ is 
also uncorrelated with 𝒛𝑖𝑔𝑡 for all 𝑡 and 𝑡
′. Finally, plugging (7) into (5) leads to the following estimating 
equation: 
𝑦𝑖𝑔𝑡 = 𝜓1 + 𝒔𝑖𝑔𝑡
′ 𝜷 + 𝒙𝑖𝑔𝑡
′ 𝜹 + ?̅?𝑔
′ 𝛏1 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝒗𝑖𝑔𝑡
′ 𝝋 + 𝜁𝑖𝑔𝑡 .  (8) 
Note that 𝜁𝑖𝑔𝑡 is uncorrelated with all the variables on the right-hand-side of (8), including 𝒔𝑖𝑔𝑡. Let 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑡,𝑗 
denote the 𝑗𝑡ℎ element of 𝒔𝑖𝑔𝑡, where 𝑗 indexes the type of housing share, 𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝐽. The inclusion of 
𝜈𝑖𝑔𝑡,𝑗, in the original equation “controls” for the endogeneity of 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑡,𝑗. 
Since 𝒗𝑖𝑔𝑡 is unobserved, a two-step CF estimation procedure can be implemented as follows: In the 
first step, we estimate (6) by a pooled OLS regression and obtain the residuals, ?̂?𝑖𝑔𝑡. In the second step, we 
estimate (8) by pooled OLS, where 𝒗𝑖𝑔𝑡 is replaced with ?̂?𝑖𝑔𝑡. To test if the 𝑗
𝑡ℎ type of housing share, 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑡,𝑗, 
is exogenous, we can easily apply a cluster-robust 𝑡 test of 𝐻0: 𝜑𝑗 = 0, where 𝜑𝑗 is the 𝑗
𝑡ℎ element of 𝝋. 
                                                     
20 Because our panel of seven years is relatively short in duration, an explanatory variable and its time mean will obviously be 
highly correlated, creating a possible multicollinearity problem and inefficient estimates. The precision of our estimates was 
substantially improved by computing the time means at the tract level. 
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Since the second step utilizes generated regressors, the standard errors need to be adjusted for the first-step 
sampling error. We obtain valid standard errors by bootstrapping based on 1,000 replications if exogeneity 
is rejected.21  
To obtain an instrument where exogeneity is rejected, we first defined a base year preceding the 
beginning of our panel. We chose 2004, two years before the start of the panel, as the base year.22 Using 
the entire county, we then calculated the percentage change in the housing share (𝑠) at the county level 
between the base and current years, excluding the home neighborhood value. These percentage changes 
were then multiplied by the base year value of the share to obtain a prediction of the current year share 
value (?̂?), assuming the growth in the share followed the change that occurred at the county level.23 
Formally, 
 ?̂?𝑖𝑔𝑡,𝑗 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑡0,𝑗 ×
𝑠𝑐𝑡,𝑗
𝑠𝑐𝑡0,𝑗
 ,  (9) 
where as before 𝑖, 𝑔 and 𝑗 index block group, tract, and the type of housing share, respectively. 𝑐 represents 
the county, 𝑡 refers to the current year, and 𝑡0 signifies the base year (2004). While the racial mix within 
the neighborhood may affect 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑡,𝑗, it should not have an effect on ?̂?𝑖𝑔𝑡,𝑗 . However, the validity of our 
instrument also depends on whether the neighborhood base year housing share values are exogenous. For 
example, there may be an omitted variable that is correlated with the base year shares (say the level of 
neighborhood crime) that has a delayed impact (two years) on the racial or income composition of the 
neighborhood. In that case, our instrument would, in part, be capturing the crime effect and would not be 
orthogonal to the error term of equation (1). However, evidence suggesting that this potential problem may 
not be of sufficient concern to invalidate our instrument is based on the robustness of our findings from 
                                                     
21 Under the null, we do not need to adjust the standard errors by bootstrapping. 
22 The housing shares for each neighborhood are available from the property tax records for years preceding the beginning of our 
panel. The year 2004 was chosen as the base year because it resulted in the most favorable first-stage diagnostics in the 2SLS 
estimation of model (1). These diagnostics were employed to judge the quality of our instruments, because first-stage diagnostics 
are not provided by the CF method. As noted below, using years earlier than 2004 as the base year had little effect on our estimated 
share effects, but as expected there was some loss in their precision. 
23 The general idea underlying these instruments is that changes within a smaller geographic unit of a larger unit containing the 
smaller unit are driven by factors within both the smaller and larger units.  
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reaching backward in time in defining our base year values. For example, using 𝑡-3 or 𝑡-4 as our base year 
yields results that mirror the results we report below for 𝑡-2. 
Besides ?̂? satisfying the assumption of strict exogeneity, its validity as an instrument hinges upon its 
correlation with 𝑠. As noted above, for first-stage diagnostics we relied upon the estimation of 2SLS 
models. The results show that for all of our housing shares treated as endogenous, ?̂? and 𝑠 are strongly 
correlated, with the first-stage F-statistic significant at better than the 1% level. 24  Therefore, 𝒛𝑖𝑔𝑡 =
(𝒙𝑖𝑔𝑡
′ , ?̂?𝑖𝑔𝑡
′ )′ was used in the estimation of (6) and (8), where ?̂?𝑖𝑔𝑡 = (?̂?𝑖𝑔𝑡,1, ?̂?𝑖𝑔𝑡,2, … , ?̂?𝑖𝑔𝑡,𝐽)
′. 
5.2 Migration Models 
To address our second issue of the roles played by the entry and exit of different racial/income groups 
in response to changes in the housing shares in generating the changes in the black/poor percentage of the 
neighborhood, we estimated the following Poisson regression model:25 
 𝐸(𝐶𝑖𝑔𝑡|𝒔𝑖𝑔𝑡 , 𝒁𝑖𝑔, 𝛼𝑔, 𝜃𝑡, 𝜀𝑖𝑔𝑡) = exp (𝒔𝑖𝑔𝑡
′ 𝜷 + 𝛼𝑔 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑔𝑡), (10) 
where as before 𝑖, 𝑔 and 𝑡 index block group, tract, and time period, respectively, for 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛; 𝑔 =
1, 2, … , 𝐺; and 𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇. 𝐶𝑖𝑔𝑡 is the five-year average covering years 𝑡 through 𝑡 + 4 of the number of 
people of interest residing in neighborhood 𝑖 within tract 𝑔. Specifically, 𝐶𝑖𝑔𝑡 refers to the number of non-
Hispanic blacks, or non-Hispanic whites, or Hispanics in the racial migration models; and 𝐶𝑖𝑔𝑡 represents 
the number of poor, or very poor in the income migration models. 𝒔𝑖𝑔𝑡 is the vector of housing shares 
measured for neighborhood 𝑖 within tract 𝑔 on January 1 of year 𝑡. 𝛼𝑔 is unobserved time-invariant tract-
specific heterogeneity, 𝜃𝑡  is year fixed effects, and 𝜀𝑖𝑔𝑡  represents time-varying omitted factors. 𝒁𝑖𝑔 =
(𝒛𝑖𝑔1, 𝒛𝑖𝑔2, … , 𝒛𝑖𝑔𝑇)
′, where 𝒛𝑖𝑔𝑡 is a column vector of strictly exogenous variables (conditional on 𝛼𝑔), 
                                                     
24 We also conducted the Sanderson-Windmeijer tests of underidentification and weak identification, respectively, of individual 
endogenous regressors. They are constructed by "partialling-out" linear projections of the remaining endogenous regressors. The 
null hypothesis is that the particular endogenous regressor in question is unidentified. Test results based on robust F-statistics 
indicated that the null could be rejected at better than the 1% level for each of our endogenous variables. 
25 To be clear, when we refer to entry (exit), we mean that the 5-year average of the number of the group increased (decreased), 
which means that on average the number entering was greater than (less than) the number leaving. We make no allowance for births 
and deaths, so there is some random error in our entry and exit measures.  
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which consists of the set of instrumental variables constructed following (9). Since (10) is nonlinear in 
parameters, it is difficult to apply the standard IV methods. However, a two-step CF estimation can be 
readily performed analogously to the estimation of the linear composition model. 
In specific, using the Mundlak device to model the tract fixed effects as in (3), we have  
𝐸(𝐶𝑖𝑔𝑡|𝒔𝑖𝑔𝑡, 𝒁𝑖𝑔, 𝜃𝑡, 𝑢𝑖𝑔𝑡) = exp (𝜓1 + 𝒔𝑖𝑔𝑡
′ 𝜷 + ?̅?𝑔
′ 𝛏1 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑔𝑡), (11) 
where 𝑢𝑖𝑔𝑡 = 𝑟𝑔 + 𝜀𝑖𝑔𝑡. In addition, recall that under (2) and (4), the reduced form of 𝒔𝑖𝑔𝑡 is given by (6). 
Assume that (𝑢𝑖𝑔𝑡 , 𝒗𝑖𝑔𝑡
′ ) is independent of 𝒁𝑖𝑔, where 𝒗𝑖𝑔𝑡 is the reduced form error defined in (6). Further 
assume that 𝐸[exp(𝑢𝑖𝑔𝑡) |𝒗𝑖𝑔𝑡] = exp (𝜂 + 𝒗𝑖𝑔𝑡
′ 𝝆), which is implied by joint normality of (𝑢𝑖𝑔𝑡 , 𝒗𝑖𝑔𝑡
′ ) but 
can be more general.26 We then obtain the following estimating equation: 
𝐸(𝐶𝑖𝑔𝑡|𝒔𝑖𝑔𝑡 , 𝒁𝑖𝑔, 𝜃𝑡, 𝒗𝑖𝑔𝑡) = exp (𝜇 + 𝒔𝑖𝑔𝑡
′ 𝜷 + ?̅?𝑔
′ 𝛏1 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝒗𝑖𝑔𝑡
′ 𝝆), (12) 
where 𝜇 = 𝜓1 + 𝜂. 
Now it is readily seen that (12) can be estimated by the following two-step CF method: In the first step, 
we obtain the residuals, ?̂?𝑖𝑔𝑡, from a pooled OLS regression of 𝒔𝑖𝑔𝑡 following (6). In the second step, we 
apply a quasi-maximum likelihood estimation (QMLE) to (12), where the unobserved 𝒗𝑖𝑔𝑡 is substituted 
with the first-step residuals, ?̂?𝑖𝑔𝑡. As for the composition models, to test if the 𝑗
𝑡ℎ type of housing share, 
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑡,𝑗, is exogenous, the usual robust 𝑡 test of 𝐻0: 𝜌𝑗 = 0 can be easily applied, where 𝜌𝑗 is the 𝑗
𝑡ℎ element 
of 𝝆. If exogeneity is rejected, we obtain valid standard errors for all coefficients by bootstrapping based 
on 1,000 replications. 
6. Results from Estimating the Neighborhood Composition Models 
Tables 1-3 present the results from estimating our percent black, percent poor, and percent very poor 
equations using as observations all neighborhoods within the county (Table 1), neighborhoods where each 
group is underrepresented (Table 2), and neighborhoods located within the white suburban jurisdictions of 
                                                     
26 Note that in contrast with assumption (7) for the composition model, the linear projection argument no longer applies due to 
nonlinearity of the Poisson model. 
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the county (Table 3). For each housing share explanatory variable three numbers are given: the estimated 
coefficient, the cluster-robust standard error (in parentheses), and the change in the dependent variable 
induced by a within standard deviation change in the variable, holding all other variables constant (in 
brackets).27 
Across all three samples of neighborhoods, the share of the neighborhood’s housing units represented 
by apartments is found to have a positive and statistically significant effect on the percentage of the 
neighborhood’s population who are black and the percentages of the neighborhood’s households who are 
poor or very poor. Of particular interest are the magnitudes of the estimated effects obtained for the samples 
of neighborhoods where each group has been historically underrepresented. The change in percent black 
induced by a within standard deviation increase in the share of apartments is .093, which is a non-trivial 
increase when judged against the sample mean percent black (3.28%). The corresponding changes for the 
percentage of households who are poor or very poor are 1.32 and .72, which are also economically 
significant changes based on the dependent variable’s mean value (reported at the bottom of the tables). 
These results suggest that increasing the share of apartments can result in greater racial and income 
integration within neighborhoods where blacks and lower income households are underrepresented. The 
results obtained for neighborhoods within the white suburban jurisdictions indicate an increase in the 
apartments share could also allow more integration of the county’s higher quality neighborhoods. A within 
standard deviation increase in the apartment share increases percent black, percent poor, and percent very 
poor by .21, 1.88 and .88, respectively.  
The impacts of condominium rentals as a share of a neighborhood’s housing units on the neighborhood 
black, poor and very poor percentages closely match the results obtained for apartments when using the all 
neighborhoods and underrepresented neighborhoods samples. For the latter neighborhoods, the increase in 
percent black induced by a within standard deviation increase in the share of condominium rentals is .224, 
                                                     
27 Because we are using panel data a standard deviation change can be computed between two randomly selected neighborhoods 
or between two randomly selected years within the same neighborhood. We use the within change rather than the between change 
because it is the more conservative number and has the more meaningful policy interest. 
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while the corresponding changes for the percentages of households who are poor or very poor are 1.82 and 
1.03. However, in contrast to the apartments share, which is found to effect all three group percentages 
within neighborhoods located in the white suburban jurisdictions, the condominium rentals share only 
effects the poor percentage within these neighborhoods, registering an increase of .880 from a within 
standard deviation increase. 
Shares of the final type of rentals, those provided by single-family homes, produce results that differ 
from those of the shares of apartments and condominium rentals. While the latter rentals have important 
effects on the percentage of a neighborhood’s residents who are black, the share of single-family rentals 
has a statistically insignificant effect on the black percentage for all three neighborhood samples. However, 
the single-family rentals share is found to increase the percentage of a neighborhood’s households who are 
poor or very poor within neighborhoods where these groups are underrepresented. A within standard 
deviation increase in a share yields increases of 1.82 and .59 in the poor and very poor household 
percentages, respectively. The failure of single-family rentals to racially integrate neighborhoods may 
reflect relatively greater discrimination in the renting of single-family homes. While we know of no 
evidence that this is the case, unlike multi-family rental housing, single-family rentals are not covered by 
federal fair housing laws. In addition, many single-family rentals are owned by small investors who have 
direct contact with their tenants.28 If owners are prejudiced, they may choose not to rent to people of color. 
Another consideration might be an interest to maintain cordial relations with ex-neighbors, among those 
owners who previously lived in the neighborhood. 
REOs potentially improve housing affordability within a neighborhood by selling at a discounted price 
and by depressing the values of nearby homes and rentals. While we find some evidence that an increase 
in REOs as a share of a neighborhood’s housing units increase the percent black and percent poor of the 
neighborhood, the results are spotty in comparison to those obtained for the rental shares. In only two cases 
did we find REOs yielding a statistically significant effect. Using the full sample of neighborhoods, a within 
                                                     
28 Based on data obtained from CoreLogic, Mills et al. (2016) calculate that 38% of single-family rentals are owned by investors 
holding one or two units, while 60% of the rentals are owned by investors having ten or less properties. 
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standard deviation increase in the REO share increases percent poor by .415. For the white suburban 
neighborhoods sample, the same increase in the REO share raises percent black by .181. In none of the 
underrepresented samples did REOs yield a significant effect. These results suggest that REOs may have a 
weaker effect on housing affordability in comparison to rental housing. Alternatively, the affordability 
advantage offered by REOs may be largely offset in the minds of blacks and lower income households by 
their negative impact on neighborhood quality.  
Finally, in addition to the rental and REO share variables, all of our estimated models included the share 
of the neighborhood’s housing units represented by owner-occupied condominium units. An increase in the 
share of these homes is found to have no effect on neighborhood racial integration, but across all three 
neighborhood samples the effect is positive and significant for percent poor and percent very poor. While 
this unexpected finding merits additional inquiry, one testable hypothesis is that these are actually rental 
units where the owner has illegally received the homestead exemption. Another possibility is that these 
units are being sold under the county’s first-time homebuyer program, which provides mortgage loan 
subsidies to lower income households.29 
As a check on the robustness of our findings to the inclusion of non-residential properties, we reran our 
neighborhood composition models including, along with the housing shares, the neighborhood number of 
each of the following types of land uses: stores, service stations, restaurants, clubs and bars, office buildings, 
and churches. Different racial and income groups may vary in their preferences for having these land uses 
within their neighborhood and the presence of these land uses may be correlated with our housing shares. 
Hence, their inclusion may result in omitted variable biases. Generally, these land uses yielded only a few 
significant effects on the racial or income mix of the neighborhood. Moreover, there inclusion had little 
impact on the results obtained for the housing shares. The land uses that were sometimes significant in 
affecting racial or income segregation were stores, restaurants and office buildings. 
                                                     
29  A description of this program is provided at https://www8.miamidade.gov/global/housing/affordable-homeownership-
program.page. 
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The results from estimating our racial and income neighborhood composition models suggest that the 
percentage of a neighborhood’s population who are black and the percentage of a neighborhood’s 
households who are poor depend on the share of the neighborhood’s housing units that are rentals. The 
increase in these percentages from a larger share of rentals may be driven by black/low income in-migration, 
non-black/higher income exit, or some combination of both entry and exit. In the next section we report the 
results obtained from estimating our migration models, which are relevant to this issue. 
7. Results from Estimating the Migration Models 
We estimated separate Poisson Control Function (PCF) models explaining the five-year average (𝑡 to 
𝑡 + 4) neighborhood net migration of non-Hispanic blacks, non-Hispanic whites, and Hispanics using all 
three of our neighborhood samples. We also estimated PCF models explaining the neighborhood net 
migrations of poor, very poor, and non-poor households for all samples. The explanatory housing share 
variables, measured for 𝑡, are identical to those entering the neighborhood income and racial composition 
models. Our purpose was to explore, in those cases where a housing share had a statistically significant 
effect on the share of the neighborhood’s residents who are black, the extent to which the change in the 
black share was driven by the housing share’s effect on black entry versus its effect on the exit of whites or 
Hispanics. Similarly, we wished to learn the extent to which an induced housing share increase in the share 
of a neighborhood’s households who are poor or very poor was the result of poor entry versus non-poor 
exit. The complexity of the task and the volume of results required summarizing the results in an easily 
readable format. Hence, we report the detailed results from the estimation of the PCF models in Appendix 
B and “comparison of effects” tables in this section (Tables 4-6). To illustrate the construction of these 
tables, we will focus on apartment rentals and neighborhood racial integration. To assess the importance of 
black entry we calculated how the mean black share of the neighborhood would be altered from the change 
in the number of blacks induced by a one percent increase in the apartments share, assuming there was no 
change in the number of whites or Hispanics. To accomplish this, we first calculated the black share as 
𝐵/(𝐵 + 𝑊 + 𝐻), where 𝐵, 𝑊, and 𝐻 are the sample mean numbers of each group. For the full sample of 
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neighborhoods, this equaled 283/ (283+1068+297) or .1717. From the PCF model estimated for blacks the 
change in 𝐵 from a one percent increase in the share of apartments is 5.6. So the new mean black share is 
now 288.6/ (288.6+1068+297) or .1745. The implied percentage increase in the mean black share is 1.63. 
The PCF model estimated for whites yields an exit of 2.6, so the new black share mean from this change 
alone is 283/ (283+1068+294.4) or .17199. The implied percentage increase in the mean share black is .17. 
Replicating this same procedure for Hispanics resulted in no increase in the mean black share. So we 
conclude from this experiment that the increase in the black share of the neighborhood’s population from a 
one percent increase in the share of apartment rentals is being driven by both black entry and white exit, 
but the former effect is many times more dominate. The changes in the black share from black entry/exit, 
white entry/exit, and Hispanic entry/exit are labeled in the first comparison table (Table 4) the “black 
effect”, “white effect”, and “Hispanic effect” which are reported in Columns (1), (2), and (3), respectively. 
The fourth column of the table indicates the sign and statistical significance of the estimated effect of each 
of the housing share variables in the racial composition model. We are most interested in the comparison 
of effects (i.e., the importance of black entry relative to non-black exit) where the rentals shares have a 
positive significant effect on the share (percent) black.30 
In addition to the share of apartments, the results from the racial composition model indicated that the 
condominium rentals share also has a positive and significant effect on the black share. As for apartments, 
the results from the PCF models based on the full sample of neighborhoods indicate that the condominium 
effect comes almost entirely from black entry (Panel A, Table 4). Using the sample of neighborhoods where 
blacks are underrepresented, the shares of apartments and condominium rentals are again found to have 
positive and statistically significant effects on the black share. The results from the estimated PCF models   
show that the increase in the black share from apartments and condominiums is coming entirely from black 
entry and not from either white or Hispanic exit (Panel B, Table 4). In the black share equation estimated 
                                                     
30 For completeness, the tables also include a comparison of effects for owner-occupied condominium units and REOs. We restrict 
our discussion, however, to just rentals in light of their stronger performance in estimating the neighborhood racial and income 
composition models. The large magnitudes of the estimated effects of REOs in these tables and  the tables in Appendix B are due 
to a one percentage point increase in an REO share representing a very large change relative to the means of the REO shares, which 
range from 0.13% to 0.28% in different samples (see Table A.1 in Appendix A). 
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for the neighborhoods within the white suburban jurisdictions only the share of apartments has a positive, 
significant effect. Again, the results from the estimation of the PCF models reveal that this effect comes 
entirely from black entry (Panel C, Table 4). 
Turning to the results for the share of the neighborhood’s households who are poor (Table 5), from the 
estimation of the neighborhood income composition model, increases in all three types of rentals increase 
the poor share and this is true across all three of our samples. In the case of an increase in the share of 
single-family rentals, the migration results for all three samples indicate that the induced increase in the 
poor share is coming entirely from the exit of non-poor households. In contrast, based on the full sample of 
neighborhoods increases in the poor share from apartments and condominium rentals comes entirely from 
poor entry (Panel A, Table 5). However, according to the migration estimates obtained from the 
underrepresented (Panel B, Table 5) and suburban samples (Panel C, Table 5), both poor entry and non-
poor exit are contributing to the increase in the poor share from these two type of rentals. The results for 
the very poor household share of the neighborhood closely match those obtained for poor households (Table 
6), with the exception that the share of single-family rentals increases the very poor share only from the 
underrepresented sample, but again the effect is coming almost entirely from non-poor exit. 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper our interest was in whether an increase in a neighborhood’s share of housing units 
represented by REOs or different types of rentals results in a neighborhood becoming more racially or 
income integrated. Contributing to this interest is the recent growth in these shares, especially in single-
family rentals. We offered a conceptual framework for why resorting across neighborhoods might occur in 
response to changes in these shares. REOs and rentals increase household utility by reducing the costs that 
must be paid to move into and live in the neighborhood, but reduce utility by eroding the quality of the 
neighborhood. Possible variance across racial and income groups in the strength of the pull of enhanced 
affordability versus that of the push of lower neighborhood quality may result in changes in the racial and 
income composition of neighborhoods. To address this issue empirically, we estimated control function 
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models using panel data on Miami-Dade County neighborhoods. The CF models controlled for unobserved 
heterogeneity across neighborhoods, uniform time effects affecting all neighborhoods, and the possible 
endogeneity of the housing unit shares. CF models were also used to explore whether a change in the racial 
or income composition of a neighborhood in response to changes in the housing shares is due to black/lower 
income entry versus non-black/higher income exit.  
Our results suggest that increases in the shares of apartments and condominium rentals increase both 
neighborhood racial and income integration. Moreover, it is black entry and not non-black exit that accounts 
for the improvement in racial integration. These findings support policies directed toward creating more of 
these types of rentals in an effort to achieve greater racial integration at the neighborhood level. The 
improvement in income integration that comes from these rentals is the result of both poor entry and non-
poor exit. Hence, if the goal is to increase neighborhood income integration, these two effects need to be 
carefully considered. An important issue for further inquiry is why higher income households avoid 
neighborhoods with larger shares of these rentals. Is it the crime they engender, the negative sight 
externalities they emit, or perhaps the type of tenant that they attract? A neighborhood’s share of single-
family rentals has decidedly different effects on integration and the migration of groups accounting for any 
effect. While these rentals improve neighborhood income integration, they have no effect on racial 
integration. Moreover, in the former case, the improvement is entirely the result of higher income 
households exiting the neighborhood. Again, these results point to the need for further research. We have 
suggested that discrimination may play a more important role in the single-family rental market and that 
this may account for the failure of their neighborhood share to affect the racial mix. We encourage tests of 
this hypothesis. In addition, future research should focus on the factors underlying higher income flight in 
response to single-family rentals, along with our suggestion above for studying flight in response to the 
other two types of rentals. A key question is whether these factors differ across the different types of rentals. 
The overarching policy implication that can be drawn from our findings is that increasing housing 
affordability within neighborhoods where blacks and lower income households have historically been 
underrepresented can result in more racially and income integrated local housing markets. As we alluded 
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to in the introduction of this paper, there is a plethora of likely positive outcomes from achieving this result. 
Market trends in favor of rentals representing a larger share of the housing within America’s urban 
neighborhoods are likely to continue, especially from the conversion of owner-occupied single-family units. 
This will enhance the affordable housing options available to disadvantaged households in better 
neighborhoods. Policies can also be implemented to further this expansion. The approach most frequently 
recommended is inclusionary zoning, where developers of multi-family housing projects are required to set 
aside a percentage of their units at below market prices. However, there is the risk that the penalty imposed 
on developers will kill the entire project. Another concern is the possible opposition of residents within 
better neighborhoods to any type of affordable housing. NIMBYism is the reality and local governments 
have offered little resistance. We have offered some encouraging results from our previous research where 
we find that the imposition of impact fees by suburban jurisdictions increases the quantity of multifamily 
housing receiving project approval (Burge and Ihlanfeldt, 2006). In essence the fees represent compensation 
to the community to offset the perceived negative externalities emitted by the housing, including the fiscal 
deficit that it allegedly creates. Perhaps, similar compensation at the neighborhood level would also raise 
the share of rental units. 
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Table 1 Estimated effects of housing tenure on racial and income composition in all neighborhoods 
 
Percent 
Black 
Percent 
Poor 
Percent 
Very Poor 
SF 0.049 0.584*** 0.121 
 (0.105) (0.100) (0.081) 
 [0.155] [1.827] [0.377] 
APT 0.095*** 0.469*** 0.284*** 
 (0.035) (0.029) (0.027) 
 [0.471] [2.318] [1.405] 
CONDO 0.068* 0.353*** 0.169*** 
 (0.038) (0.049) (0.037) 
 [0.355] [1.834] [0.877] 
CONDO OO 0.001 0.206*** 0.102*** 
 (0.025) (0.031) (0.024) 
 [0.005] [1.469] [0.731] 
REO 4.116 2.103** 1.174 
 (2.563) (1.052) (0.813) 
 [0.813] [0.415] [0.232] 
Mean of Dep. Var. 17.829 54.420 29.532 
Tracts 498 498 498 
Neighborhoods 1,534 1,534 1,534 
Observations 10,688 10,686 10,686 
Notes:  
SF = single-family rental share 
APT = apartment rental share 
REO = completed foreclosure share 
CONDO = condominium rental share 
CONDO OO = share of owner-occupied condominium 
(i) Each equation also contains year dummies, time-means of exogeneous explanatory variables at the tract 
level, and control variables for endogenous explanatory variables (estimates not reported). 
(ii) An underline indicates that the variable is treated as endogenous. 
(iii) Standard errors are in parentheses. They are clustered at the tract level if all explanatory variables are treated 
as exogeneous; otherwise they are computed based on 1,000 bootstrap replications. *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
(iv) The figure in square bracket is the change in the dependent variable induced by a within standard deviation 
change in an explanatory variable (holding all other variables constant). 
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Table 2 Estimated effects of housing tenure on racial and income composition in neighborhoods 
where black people, poor households, and very poor households are underrepresented, respectively 
 
Percent 
Black 
Percent 
Poor 
Percent 
Very Poor 
SF 0.013 0.495*** 0.161** 
 (0.042) (0.104) (0.066) 
 [0.036] [1.828] [0.591] 
APT 0.019* 0.308*** 0.152*** 
 (0.010) (0.049) (0.029) 
 [0.093] [1.318] [0.724] 
CONDO 0.042*** 0.307*** 0.177*** 
 (0.014) (0.051) (0.031) 
 [0.224] [1.815] [1.031] 
CONDO OO 0.004 0.133*** 0.065*** 
 (0.011) (0.032) (0.023) 
 [0.027] [1.263] [0.589] 
REO 1.378 1.627 1.257 
 (1.030) (1.312) (1.028) 
 [0.201] [0.273] [0.216] 
Mean of Dep. Var. 3.277 37.900 18.738 
Tracts 398 354 395 
Neighborhoods 1,120 788 883 
Observations 7,824 5,506 6,167 
Notes:  
SF = single-family rental share 
APT = apartment rental share 
REO = completed foreclosure share 
CONDO = condominium rental share 
CONDO OO = share of owner-occupied condominium 
(i) Each equation also contains year dummies and time-means of explanatory variables at the tract level. All 
explanatory variables are treated as exogeneous. 
(ii) Standard errors clustered at the tract level are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
(iii) The figure in square bracket is the change in the dependent variable induced by a within standard deviation 
change in an explanatory variable (holding all other variables constant). 
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Table 3 Estimated effects of housing tenure on racial and income composition in white suburban 
jurisdictions 
 
Percent 
Black 
Percent 
Poor 
Percent 
Very Poor 
SF 0.069 0.508*** -0.078 
 (0.066) (0.188) (0.240) 
 [0.164] [1.182] [-0.182] 
APT 0.045*** 0.400*** 0.188*** 
 (0.017) (0.060) (0.059) 
 [0.213] [1.875] [0.883] 
CONDO 0.029 0.209** -0.158 
 (0.018) (0.082) (0.098) 
 [0.121] [0.880] [-0.665] 
CONDO OO 0.019 0.341*** 0.251*** 
 (0.022) (0.075) (0.065) 
 [0.071] [1.287] [0.948] 
REO 1.548* -21.825* -20.334 
 (0.850) (11.410) (13.050) 
 [0.181] [-2.553] [-2.379] 
Mean of Dep. Var. 2.123 49.500 27.004 
Tracts 148 148 148 
Neighborhoods 408 408 408 
Observations 2,831 2,829 2,829 
Notes:  
SF = single-family rental share 
APT = apartment rental share 
REO = completed foreclosure share 
CONDO = condominium rental share 
CONDO OO = share of owner-occupied condominium 
(i) Each equation also contains year dummies, time-means of exogeneous explanatory variables at the tract 
level, and control variables for endogenous explanatory variables (estimates not reported). 
(ii) An underline indicates that the variable is treated as endogenous. 
(iii) Standard errors are in parentheses. They are clustered at the tract level if all explanatory variables are treated 
as exogeneous; otherwise they are computed based on 1,000 bootstrap replications. *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
(iv) The figure in square bracket is the change in the dependent variable induced by a within standard deviation 
change in an explanatory variable (holding all other variables constant). 
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Table 4 Percentage change in non-Hispanic black share from a one percentage point increase in a 
housing type share  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Black Effect White Effect Hispanic Effect Percentage Black 
Panel A. All neighborhoods 
SF + 1.88 + .87 0 +, I 
APT + 1.63 + .17 - .65 +, S 
CONDO + 1.79 + .08 - .65 +, S 
CONDO OO - .02 + .14 - .27 +, I 
REO + 104.38 - 18.57 - 51.31 +, I 
Panel B. Neighborhoods where blacks are underrepresented 
SF + 1.90 + 3.40 + 2.53 +, I 
APT + 1.34 + .15 - .24 +, S 
CONDO + 2.06 0 - .23 +, S 
CONDO OO + .27 + .10 + .16 +, I 
REO + 47.38 - 26.41 - 42.48 +, I 
Panel C. White suburban jurisdictions 
SF + 4.89 + .66 + 1.01 +, I 
APT + 3.16 0 0 +, S 
CONDO + 1.95 0 + .36 +, I 
CONDO OO + 2.26 0 0 +, I 
REO + 78.3 - 12.68 + 1.71 +, S 
Notes: 
SF = single-family rental share 
APT = apartment rental share 
REO = completed foreclosure share 
CONDO = condominium rental share 
CONDO OO = share of owner-occupied condominium 
(i) A plus sign in Column (1) indicates black neighborhood percentage increasing from black entry. A negative 
sign in Column (1) indicates black neighborhood percentage decreasing from black exit.  
(ii) A plus sign in Columns (2) and (3) indicates black neighborhood percentage increasing from white 
(Hispanic) exit. A negative sign in Columns (2) and (3) indicates black neighborhood percentage decreasing 
from white (Hispanic) entry.  
(iii) Column (4) indicates the sign of the estimated effect of the housing share and whether the effect is 
statistically significant (S) or statistically insignificant (I) in the racial composition model. 
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Table 5 Percentage change in poor share from a one percentage point increase in a housing type share 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Poor Effect Non-Poor Effect Percentage Poor 
Panel A. All neighborhoods 
SF 0 + .02 +, S 
APT + 1.01 0 +, S 
CONDO + 1.28 -.10 +, S 
CONDO OO + .44 0 +, S 
REO + 51.11 + 3.27 +, S 
Panel B. Neighborhoods where poor households are underrepresented 
SF - 2.36 + 6.33 +, S 
APT + .20 + .17 +, S 
CONDO + .37 + .88 +, S 
CONDO OO - .37 + .82 +, S 
REO + .57 - 37.15 +, I 
Panel C. White suburban jurisdictions 
SF - 1.63 + 1.41 +, S 
APT + .17 + .18 +, S 
CONDO - .60 + .25 +, S 
CONDO OO + .60 + .09 +, S 
REO + .35 - 6.87 -, S 
Notes: 
SF = single-family rental share 
APT = apartment rental share 
REO = completed foreclosure share 
CONDO = condominium rental share 
CONDO OO = share of owner-occupied condominium 
(i) A plus sign in Column (1) indicates poor neighborhood percentage increasing from poor entry. A negative 
sign in Column (1) indicates poor neighborhood percentage decreasing from poor exit.  
(ii) A plus sign in Column (2) indicates poor neighborhood percentage increasing from non-poor exit. A 
negative sign in Column (2) indicates poor neighborhood percentage decreasing from non-poor entry.  
(iii) Column (3) indicates the sign of the estimated effect of the housing share and whether the effect is 
statistically significant (S) or statistically insignificant (I) in the income composition model. 
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Table 6 Percentage change in very poor share from a one percentage point increase in a housing 
type share 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Very Poor Effect Non-Poor Effect Percentage Very Poor 
Panel A. All neighborhoods 
SF - .27 0 +, I 
APT + 1.99 0 +, S 
CONDO + 2.58 - .07 +, S 
CONDO OO + .93 0 +, S 
REO + 160.6 + 2.49 +, I 
Panel B. Neighborhoods where very poor households are underrepresented 
SF + .49 + 4.46 +, S 
APT + .75 + 1.42 +, S 
CONDO + 1.82 + 1.59 +, S 
CONDO OO + .22 + .67 +, S 
REO - 6.40 + 4.33 +, I 
Panel C. White suburban jurisdictions 
SF - 3.03 + 1.24 -, I 
APT + .33 + .27 +, S 
CONDO - 1.06 + .33 -, I 
CONDO OO + 1.20 0 +, S 
REO + 1.18 + 5.39 -, I 
Notes: 
SF = single-family rental share 
APT = apartment rental share 
REO = completed foreclosure share 
CONDO = condominium rental share 
CONDO OO = share of owner-occupied condominium 
(i) A plus sign in Column (1) indicates very poor neighborhood percentage increasing from very poor entry. 
A negative sign in Column (1) indicates very poor neighborhood percentage decreasing from very poor 
exit.  
(ii) A plus sign in Column (2) indicates very poor neighborhood percentage increasing from non-poor exit. A 
negative sign in Column (2) indicates very poor neighborhood percentage decreasing from non-poor entry.  
(iii) Column (3) indicates the sign of the estimated effect of the housing share and whether the effect is 
statistically significant (S) or statistically insignificant (I) in the income composition model. 
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A.  Appendix 
Table A.1 Means and standard deviations of key variables 
Variable Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Overall Between Within 
All neighborhoods 
Percent Black 17.829 28.346 27.953 5.046 
Percent Very Poor 29.532 18.647 17.401 6.888 
Percent Poor 54.420 22.921 21.823 7.232 
SF 9.952 9.545 9.024 3.137 
APT 23.613 28.926 28.554 4.945 
CONDO 15.550 21.159 20.682 5.193 
CONDO OO 14.552 20.125 18.826 7.139 
REO 0.255 0.385 0.331 0.197 
SF OO 36.078 31.938 31.098 7.375 
Neighborhoods where blacks are underrepresented 
Percent Black 3.277 6.021 5.234 2.998 
Percent Very Poor 26.636 17.445 16.137 6.660 
Percent Poor 50.416 22.758 21.606 7.219 
SF 8.399 8.519 8.020 2.878 
APT 20.298 27.581 27.148 4.845 
CONDO 18.462 22.556 22.004 5.290 
CONDO OO 17.256 21.056 19.700 7.464 
REO 0.194 0.289 0.249 0.146 
SF OO 35.390 33.131 32.264 7.579 
Neighborhoods where poor households are underrepresented 
Percent Black 11.437 21.648 21.172 4.490 
Percent Very Poor 17.531 11.003 9.211 6.022 
Percent Poor 37.900 16.160 14.330 7.477 
SF 10.858 8.593 7.764 3.696 
APT 8.609 15.973 15.390 4.273 
CONDO 17.003 23.138 22.420 5.904 
CONDO OO 16.157 21.366 19.172 9.481 
REO 0.277 0.341 0.297 0.168 
SF OO 47.096 33.363 31.937 9.767 
Neighborhoods where very poor households are underrepresented 
Percent Black 12.362 23.052 22.613 4.643 
Percent Very Poor 18.738 11.883 10.179 6.165 
Percent Poor 41.844 18.814 17.322 7.421 
SF 10.700 9.134 8.367 3.681 
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APT 11.044 19.084 18.488 4.775 
CONDO 16.925 22.750 22.069 5.816 
CONDO OO 16.249 21.460 19.454 9.097 
REO 0.271 0.350 0.305 0.172 
SF OO 44.811 33.399 32.089 9.369 
White suburban jurisdictions 
Percent Black 2.123 4.828 4.033 2.760 
Percent Very Poor 27.004 17.550 16.577 6.486 
Percent Poor 49.500 23.945 23.101 6.841 
SF 7.022 8.844 8.519 2.365 
APT 20.367 24.884 24.637 4.708 
CONDO 24.975 25.708 25.639 4.218 
CONDO OO 17.472 18.553 18.187 3.775 
REO 0.125 0.198 0.159 0.117 
SF OO 30.039 33.216 33.030 3.588 
Notes:  
SF = single-family rental share 
APT = apartment rental share 
REO = completed foreclosure share 
CONDO = condominium rental share 
CONDO OO = share of owner-occupied condominium 
SF OO = share of owner-occupied single-family rentals 
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B.  Appendix 
Table B.1 Estimated effects of housing tenure on migration by race in all neighborhoods 
 Black White Hispanic 
SF 0.023 -0.055** -0.001 
 (0.034) (0.023) (0.020) 
 [6.366] [-13.927] [-0.560] 
APT 0.020 -0.010 0.010 
 (0.013) (0.007) (0.008) 
 [5.620] [-2.633] [10.897] 
CONDO 0.022 -0.004 0.010 
 (0.023) (0.012) (0.012) 
 [6.088] [-1.112] [10.951] 
CONDO OO -0.0003 -0.008*** 0.004 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) 
 [-0.096] [-2.129] [4.723] 
REO 1.611 1.489 1.626 
 (4.221) (1.916) (3.517) 
 [455.648] [376.060] [1737.267] 
R-squared 0.186 0.205 0.143 
Tracts 498 498 498 
Neighborhoods 1,534 1,534 1,534 
Observations 10,688 10,688 10,688 
Notes:  
SF = single-family rental share 
APT = apartment rental share 
REO = completed foreclosure share 
CONDO = condominium rental share 
CONDO OO = share of owner-occupied condominium 
(i) Each equation also contains year dummies, time-means of exogenous explanatory variables at the 
tract level, and control variables for endogenous explanatory variables (estimates not reported). 
(ii) An underline indicates that the variable is treated as endogenous. 
(iii) The numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on 1,000 bootstrap replications. *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
(iv) The average marginal effects are in square brackets. 
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Table B.2 Estimated effects of housing tenure on migration by race in neighborhoods where 
blacks are underrepresented 
 Black White Hispanic 
SF              0.020* -0.089 -0.036 
                (0.012) (0.170) (0.126) 
                [1.081] [-26.067] [-45.235] 
APT              0.014*** -0.014*** 0.002 
                (0.004) (0.005) (0.011) 
                [0.782] [-4.007] [2.464] 
CONDO           0.022*** -0.009 0.002 
                (0.007) (0.007) (0.025) 
                [1.185] [-2.686] [2.397] 
CONDO OO        0.004 -0.011*** -0.003 
                (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) 
                [0.207] [-3.121] [-4.039] 
REO             0.500 1.946 0.934 
                (0.369) (9.408) (9.049) 
                [27.101] [572.303] [1169.058] 
R-squared       0.120 0.201 0.152 
Tracts          398 398 398 
Neighborhoods 1,120 1,120 1,120 
Observations    7,824 7,824 7,824 
Notes:  
SF = single-family rental share 
APT = apartment rental share 
REO = completed foreclosure share 
CONDO = condominium rental share 
CONDO OO = share of owner-occupied condominium 
(i) Each equation also contains year dummies, time-means of exogenous explanatory variables at the 
tract level, and control variables for endogenous explanatory variables (estimates not reported). 
(ii) An underline indicates that the variable is treated as endogenous. 
(iii) The numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on 1,000 bootstrap replications. *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
(iv) The average marginal effects are in square brackets. 
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Table B.3 Estimated effects of housing tenure on migration by race in white suburban jurisdictions 
 Black White Hispanic 
SF              0.048* -0.021 -0.011 
                (0.026) (0.023) (0.015) 
                [1.349] [-7.525] [-12.690] 
APT              0.030*** -0.001 0.002 
                (0.008) (0.005) (0.003) 
                [0.855] [-0.492] [2.599] 
CONDO           0.018** -0.0001 -0.003 
                (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) 
                [0.509] [-0.029] [-2.895] 
CONDO OO        0.021* -0.001 0.002 
                (0.011) (0.005) (0.003) 
                [0.599] [-0.242] [1.699] 
REO             0.803* 0.607 -0.021 
                (0.410) (0.735) (0.152) 
                [22.633] [220.928] [-23.080] 
R-squared       0.121 0.219 0.310 
Tracts          148 148 148 
Neighborhoods 408 408 408 
Observations    2,831 2,831 2,831 
Notes:  
SF = single-family rental share 
APT = apartment rental share 
REO = completed foreclosure share 
CONDO = condominium rental share 
CONDO OO = share of owner-occupied condominium 
(i) Each equation also contains year dummies, time-means of exogenous explanatory variables at the 
tract level, and control variables for endogenous explanatory variables (estimates not reported). 
(ii) An underline indicates that the variable is treated as endogenous. 
(iii) The numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on 1,000 bootstrap replications. *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
(iv) The average marginal effects are in square brackets. 
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Table B.4 Estimated effects of housing tenure on migration by income in all neighborhoods 
 Poor Very Poor Rich 
SF              0.003 -0.003 -0.001 
                (0.008) (0.017) (0.006) 
                [0.833] [-0.550] [-0.156] 
APT              0.023 0.026** -0.002 
                (0.017) (0.013) (0.002) 
                [6.912] [4.198] [-0.538] 
CONDO           0.029 0.034 0.002 
                (0.027) (0.028) (0.004) 
                [8.778] [5.453] [0.488] 
CONDO OO        0.010* 0.012** -0.0001 
                (0.006) (0.005) (0.001) 
                [2.956] [1.960] [-0.016] 
REO             3.200 4.023 -0.071 
                (4.082) (5.095) (0.054) 
                [953.093] [649.658] [-16.894] 
R-squared       0.270 0.303 0.275 
Tracts          498 498 498 
Neighborhoods 1,534 1,534 1,534 
Observations    10,688 10,688 10,688 
Notes:  
SF = single-family rental share 
APT = apartment rental share 
REO = completed foreclosure share 
CONDO = condominium rental share 
CONDO OO = share of owner-occupied condominium 
(i) Each equation also contains year dummies, time-means of exogenous explanatory variables at the 
tract level, and control variables for endogenous explanatory variables (estimates not reported). 
(ii) An underline indicates that the variable is treated as endogenous. 
(iii) The numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on 1,000 bootstrap replications. *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
(iv) The average marginal effects are in square brackets. 
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Table B.5 Estimated effects of housing tenure on migration by income in neighborhoods where 
poor or very poor households are underrepresented 
 
Neighborhoods where the Poor  
are Underrepresented 
Neighborhoods where the Very Poor 
are Underrepresented 
 Poor Rich Very Poor Rich 
SF              -0.038 -0.097 0.006 -0.091** 
                (0.050) (0.065) (0.009) (0.038) 
                [-7.711] [-30.866] [0.661] [-27.844] 
APT              0.004 -0.007 0.009*** -0.014** 
                (0.009) (0.015) (0.003) (0.007) 
                [0.711] [-2.352] [0.967] [-4.269] 
CONDO           0.006 -0.014 0.013** -0.018** 
                (0.014) (0.021) (0.006) (0.009) 
                [1.220] [-4.524] [1.382] [-5.409] 
CONDO OO        -0.006 -0.013 0.003 -0.015** 
                (0.006) (0.011) (0.002) (0.006) 
                [-1.177] [-4.242] [0.310] [-4.456] 
REO             0.009 0.965 -0.077 -0.088 
                (0.089) (2.321) (0.066) (0.074) 
                [1.884] [307.728] [-8.193] [-27.039] 
R-squared       0.152 0.098 0.195 0.123 
Tracts          354 354 395 395 
Neighborhoods 788 788 883 883 
Observations    5,506 5,506 6,167 6,167 
Notes:  
SF = single-family rental share 
APT = apartment rental share 
REO = completed foreclosure share 
CONDO = condominium rental share 
CONDO OO = share of owner-occupied condominium 
(i) Each equation also contains year dummies, time-means of exogenous explanatory variables at the tract 
level, and control variables for endogenous explanatory variables (estimates not reported). 
(ii) An underline indicates that the variable is treated as endogenous. 
(iii) The numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on 1,000 bootstrap replications. *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
(iv) The average marginal effects are in square brackets. 
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Table B.6 Estimated effects of housing tenure on migration by income in white suburban jurisdictions 
 Poor Very Poor Rich 
SF              -0.034** -0.040** -0.029** 
                (0.015) (0.018) (0.013) 
                [-9.896] [-6.474] [-7.837] 
APT              0.003 0.003 -0.004 
                (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) 
                [0.954] [0.412] [-0.964] 
CONDO           -0.013 -0.015 -0.005 
                (0.008) (0.010) (0.004) 
                [-3.678] [-2.470] [-1.425] 
CONDO OO        0.013*** 0.014*** -0.002 
                (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
                [3.745] [2.207] [-0.534] 
REO             -0.105 0.013 -0.137 
                (0.196) (0.236) (0.118) 
                [-30.780] [2.165] [-36.399] 
R-squared       0.361 0.348 0.144 
Tracts          148 148 148 
Neighborhoods 408 408 408 
Observations    2,831 2,831 2,831 
Notes:  
SF = single-family rental share 
APT = apartment rental share 
REO = completed foreclosure share 
CONDO = condominium rental share 
CONDO OO = share of owner-occupied condominium 
(i) Each equation also contains year dummies, time-means of exogenous explanatory variables at the 
tract level, and control variables for endogenous explanatory variables (estimates not reported). 
(ii) An underline indicates that the variable is treated as endogenous. 
(iii) The numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on 1,000 bootstrap replications. *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
(iv) The average marginal effects are in square brackets. 
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